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Maintaining a Healthy Water Supply While

Growing a Healthy Food Supply: Legal Tools for
Cleaning Up Agricultural Water Pollution
Mary Jane Angelo'
Jon Morris2
INTRODUCTION

Agriculture provides the food, fuel and fiber that support human
civilization. As the global population grows, more and more demands
will be placed on our agricultural system to produce ever greater crop
yields. Unless new strategies are employed, the pressure to increase
production will exacerbate the environmental impacts of high intensity
industrialized agriculture. Although agriculture is one of the most
significant and pernicious causes of water pollution in the U.S., federal
environmental laws designed to protect water resources exclude or
exempt most agricultural activities. State efforts to address water quality
impacts from agriculture have met with little success. The challenge of
finding a way to reduce agricultural water pollution without causing
severe economic harm to farmers is one of the greatest environmental
challenges of our time.
Large scale industrialized agriculture, with its heavy reliance on
fertilizer, pesticide and water inputs, is a major contributor to water
pollution. Agricultural practices can cause serious adverse impacts to the
quality of both groundwater and surface water. Rain or irrigation water
that falls on farm fields picks up water soluble pesticides such as atrazine
and nutrients such as nitrites found in fertilizers, causing them to leach
into groundwater. Rain and irrigation water that is not absorbed into the
soil runs off of agricultural fields carrying with it a variety of pollutants
which ultimately end up in surface waterbodies. Run-off from farm
1. Professor of Law & Director, Environmental and Land Use Law Program University of
Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to thank UF Law Student and former potato fanner,
Christopher Johns, for research assistance and for providing insight into farming practices in Florida.
2. University of Florida Levin College of Law, J.D. expected May 2014.
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fields frequently contains high levels of sediments from soil erosion from
tilled fields, pesticides and fertilizers. Pesticides that enter waterbodies
can adversely impact aquatic life. Nutrients from fertilizers can cause
waterbodies to be hyper-eutrophied, which can severely impact
submersed plants and aquatic animals. Run-off of sediments from soil
erosion due to tilling can clog streams and fill in shallow areas in
waterbodies, thereby reducing habitat and light availability to submersed
plants. A report by the National Water Quality Inventory identified
agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution as "the leading source of
water quality impacts on surveyed rivers and lakes, the second largest
source of impairments to wetlands, and a major3 contributor to
contamination of surveyed estuaries and ground water.",
The federal Clean Water Act (CWA),4 the primary federal authority
for addressing water pollution, has been largely successful at reducing
water pollution from point sources (PS) such as wastewater treatment
plants and industrial discharges through the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES). A major shortcoming of the NPDES
program, however, is that it does not apply to NPS discharges, including
most agricultural run-off.
Because most pollutant discharges to
waterbodies from agriculture are not subject to NPDES regulation,
responsibility for addressing agricultural water pollution has fallen
largely to the states. To date, the vast majority of state programs have
been voluntary or incentive-based programs designed to encourage
farmers to implement Best Management Practices (BMPs) to reduce runoff of contaminated water. These programs have had very limited
success, and therefore, agricultural pollution continues to be one of the
most significant sources of water quality degradation in the U.S.
Accordingly, a further evaluation of the legal tools available to address
the challenges of agricultural water pollution is warranted.
This article will explore a number of legal mechanisms that could
play a role in ensuring that discharges from agricultural activities do not
cause or contribute to violations of water quality standards. Specifically,
this article will evaluate the relative effectiveness of: (1) narrative
nutrient criteria as compared with numeric nutrient criteria; (2) TMDL
implementation through regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms; and
(3) the relative efficacy of design-based standards such as BMPs and

3. Agricultural Nonpoint Source Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
(Mar. 2005), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/agriculturefacts.cfm.
4. Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).

2014]

MAINTAINING A HEALTHY WATER SUPPLY

1005

performance-based standards in reducing water pollution from
agriculture. The article will draw on experiences from the State of
Florida, including Everglades' restoration program and efforts, such as
water quality trading programs, and efforts to reduce agricultural
pollution in other states to demonstrate the efficacy of a variety of
approaches. The article will suggest a multifaceted, watershed-based
approach comprised of a combination of regulatory and non-regulatory
tools designed to reduce nutrient pollution from agricultural run-off.
I.

AGRICULTURAL NUTRIENT POLLUTION

Nutrient run-off from agricultural fertilizer is one of the leading
causes of water pollution in the U.S. Throughout much of our
agricultural history, nutrients needed to grow crops came from the
nutrient-rich soils in which the crops were grown. 5 However, in
geographic regions lacking nutrient-rich soils, supplemental nutrients
were provided either by the use of animal wastes (manure) or plant
compost. Natural fertilizers such as animal manure have long been used
to provide the nutrients necessary to grow crops. 6 In addition, farmers
frequently enriched soils by planting crops rich in nutrients as "green
manure." 7 Typical farming practices included crop rotation, covercropping, and intercropping with nitrogen-fixing legume crops which
add nutrients to the soil.
The technical advances of the "Green Revolution" of the 1960's
transformed the way farming is done in the U.S. The focus of the Green
Revolution was on maximizing crop yields for a growing global
population.8 To do so, it was necessary to supplement human labor with
large inputs of synthetic fertilizers, as well as heavy inputs of pesticides
and water. 9 During this time, agricultural systems evolved from being
nutrient "sinks," wherein crop plants absorbed nutrients and incorporated
them into plant tissue, into nutrient "sources," in which plant crops could

5. See James F. Parr & Sharon B. Homick, Agricultural Use of Organic Amendments: A
Historical Perspective, 7 AM. J. ALTERNATIVE AGRIC. 181-89 (1992) (providing an extensive
history of fertilization methods).
6. Id.
7.

See MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE'S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR

MEALS 210-13 (2006) (explaining that green manure can provide the nutrients that crops need to
grow effectively).
8. William S.Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing EnvironmentalDegradationand Poor
Public Health with Our Nation's Tax Dollars,28 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 213, 251 (2009).
9. Id. at 255.
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only absorb a small percentage of the large amount of fertilizer applied to
the field. Nutrients that were not used by the plants became a source of
pollution.1 ° For example, during the past 50 years, in excess of 600 tons
of phosphorous were applied to agricultural lands globally, with only
about 250 tons being removed by the plant. 1
One of the most significant changes that occurred as part of the
Green Revolution was the separation of animal livestock production
from plant crop production. Animal wastes, previously relied upon to
enrich cropland with nutrients were no longer on the same site as the
cropland. Vast quantities of concentrated animal waste, generated on
feedlots, became a significant water quality concern and the lack of
animal waste on the croplands created the need to bring in synthetic
fertilizers.' 2 What had been a mutually beneficial system in which
animal wastes fertilized the crops that fed the animals in a relatively
"closed loop" system, with minimal pollution, became a serious
3
environmental problem.'
The Green Revolution was a huge success in that it dramatically
increased per acre crop yields. During this period, new federal
government policies that linked subsidies to production levels further
encouraged high-yield farming. 14 Increases in government funding for
research and development on high yield agriculture techniques coupled
with education of farmers in these techniques by the network of
agricultural extension agents also contributed to the dramatic rise in
high-yield commodity farming.' 5 The Green Revolution is considered a
major success in that it is estimated to have resulted in an increase of6
more than 150% in farm production over the past 60 years.'
10. See A. N. SHARPLEY ET AL., AGRIC. RESEARCH SERV., BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES To
MINIMIZE AGRICULTURAL PHOSPHORUS IMPACTS ON WATER QUALITY 1-3 (U.S. Dept. of Agric.
2006),
available
at
http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/np/BestMgmtPractices/Best/ 20
Management%20Practices.pdf (using phosphorus as an example of a nutrient that creates
environmental problems through water eutrophication).
11. Id. (noting that in the U.S., approximately 4.5 metric tons of phosphorous have been used
as fertilizer each year since 1994); see also U.S. Geological Survey, FERTILIZERS - SUSTAINING
GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLIES, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs155-99/fs155-99.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
12. See Eubanks, supra note 8, at 260.
13. See id. at 259-60 (comparing waste in pre-Green Revolution times to modem
environmental problems).
14. Karen R. Hansen, Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Need for an American
Farm Policy Based on an IntegratedSystems Approach Recoupled to Environmental Stewardship,
15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 303, 307-08 (1994).
15" See Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking US. Agricultural
Policy in a ChangingGlobal Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 593, 602 (2010).
16. Agricultural Productivity in the United States, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
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Unfortunately, the heavy inputs of fertilizers, pesticides and water
necessary to obtain those high yields also caused significant
17
environmental impacts, including degradation of the nation's waters.
According to the EPA's 2000 National Water Quality Inventory,
NPS pollution is the most significant source of water-quality impacts on
surveyed rivers and lakes and the second leading source of contamination
to groundwater and estuaries. 18 A 2009 report identified nutrient water
pollution as one of the most significant water quality and public health
concerns in the country. 19 According to the report, significant increases
in nutrient pollution in U.S. waterbodies over the past 50 years have
significantly impacted "drinking water supplies, aquatic life and
recreational water quality. '20 The report identifies nutrient pollution as
the cause of water quality impairment for approximately 20% of river
and stream miles (approximately 80,000 miles), 22% of lake acres, and
8% of bay and estuary miles. 21 According to the report "[n]utrient
pollution from row crop agricultural operations, a by-product of excess
manure and chemical fertilizer application, is the 22source of many local
and downstream adverse nutrient-related impacts.
Modern industrial agriculture relies on synthetic fertilizers derived
from fossil fuels to provide the nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorous and
potassium) needed to promote plant growth and provide high crop
yields.23 The nutrients contained in these fertilizers, particularly nitrogen
and phosphorous, can cause substantial environmental harms if they are
transported into waterbodies. 24 Just as these nutrients promote crop
growth on the farm, they also promote algae growth in the water. Excess

ECONOMIC
RESEARCH
SERVICE
(Sept.
27,
2013),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/agricultural-productivity-in-the-us.aspx#2010-2-1.
17. See Angelo, supra note 15, at 602; Eubanks, supra note 8, at 251-52, 260 (pointing to
environmental effect of high-yield-crop technology).
18.

Agricultural Nonpoint Source Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

(2005), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/agriculture-facts.cfn.
19. STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GROUP, AN URGENT CALL TO ACTION:
REPORT OF THE STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GROUP 1 (2009), available at

http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/nitgreport.pdf [hereinafter State-EPA Report].
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. at5.
22. Id. at 17.
23.

Nutrient Management and Fertilizer, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Nov.

14, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/oecaagct/tfer.html.
24. Jan Lewandrowski et al., The Interface Between Agricultural Assistance and the
Environment: Chemical Fertilizer Consumption and Area Expansion, 73 LAND ECON. 404, 407

(1997).
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nutrients in waterbodies can result in rapid algal growth. 25
An
overabundance of algae depletes oxygen and blocks sunlight penetration,
resulting in a condition referred to as eutrophication.2 6 Eutrophication
can lead to significant and sometimes irreversible damage to lakes,
rivers, and coastal oceans. Damage includes, among other things,
blooms of algal species that may be toxic or harmful to humans and
aquatic life, death of coral reefs and loss of coral reef communities,
decreases in water transparency, problems with taste and odor of water,
increased incidence of fish kills, shifts in pollution of fish species away
from desirable species to "trash" species, and overall decreased aesthetic
value of the waterbody.27
Although excessive nutrients can cause serious problems in virtually
any waterbody, one of the most significant harms occurs when nutrientladen water flows into estuarine areas and causes hypoxic areas or "dead
zones" in areas that previously had high fish and aquatic organism
productivity.2 8 One notable dead zone is in the northern portion of the
Gulf of Mexico, where both the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers spill
into the gulf. Agricultural activities in the Mississippi River basin are
believed to account for approximately 66% of the nitrogen entering the
gulf.29 Nitrogen and phosphorous from both agriculture and urban runoff are washed into the tributaries of the Mississippi River and ultimately
flow downriver until they reach the Gulf of Mexico. 30 These nutrients
promote blooms of algae, bacteria, and cyanobacteria, 3' which ultimately
result in depletion of oxygen, or hypoxia.32 The hypoxic area, or dead

25. Eubanks, supra note 8, at 256.
26. See id. ("[A~s more algae is created from increased chemical nutrients in the water, less
oxygen is available for phytoplankton and other organisms in the aquatic ecosystem. When the
oxygen slips below a certain level, the water takes on the effects of hypoxia, or a shortage of oxygen.
A hypoxic area quickly becomes a 'dead zone' because fish and other mobile organisms leave due to
the lack of oxygen and all other organisms will die offand cause a food chain collapse."); SHARLEY
ET AL., supra note 10, at 1 (explaining effect process of phosphorous biosphere contamination).
27. S.R. Carpenter et al., NonpointPollutionof Surface Waters with Phosphorus and Nitrogen,
8 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATION 559, 561 (1998).

28. Eubanks, supranote 8, at 256.
29. Id.
30.

JOHN A. DOWNING ET AL., GULF OF MEXICO HYPOXIA: LAND-SEA INTERACTIONS 1-2

(Council for Agric. Sci, & Tech. 1999).
31. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY SCI. ADVISORY BD., EPA-SAB-08-003,
HYPOXIA IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO: AN UPDATE BY THE EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY

BOARD
10
(2007),
available
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/C3D2F27094E03F90852573B800601 D93/$File/EPASAB-08-003complete.unsigned.pdf.
32. Id; DOWNING ETAL., supra note 30, at 5.
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zone, in the northern Gulf of Mexico covers 16,500 square kilometers
(10,250 square miles) along the coast. The Gulf of Mexico dead zone is
the largest of the hypoxic zones in the U.S.; however, numerous other
large waterbodies in the U.S. are impacted by excess nutrients from
agricultural run-off. Examples include the Chesapeake Bay 33 and the
Florida Everglades, among many others.34
II. THE FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT
In 1972 Congress enacted amendments to the Clean Water Act
(CWA), which significantly improved the federal government's ability to
regulate pollution entering into U.S. waterbodies.35 Unfortunately, due
to limitations of the CWA, many of the nation's waterbodies are still
negatively impacted by water pollutants. Specifically, the inability of the
CWA to meaningfully reduce the discharge of pollutants from NPS
pollution, predominantly agriculture, has led to increased nutrient
loading into waterbodies. 36 NPS pollution is difficult to regulate because
there are generally no end of pipe discharges that can be measured and
monitored.37 NPS polluters are not regulated by the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), the main regulatory tool that is
used to control pollutant discharge into waterbodies.38 The current
NPDES program regulates PS pollution but fails to account for the
significant pollutant discharge coming from NPS.
A. The National PollutantDischargeElimination System Permitting
Program
The most significant regulatory program in the CWA is the NPDES

33.

RITA CESTTI ET AL., AGRICULTURE NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL: GOOD

MANAGEMENT PRACTICES-THE CHESAPEAKE BAY EXPERIENCE 1 (World Bank 2003).
34. Steven M. Davis, Phosphorus Inputs and Vegetation Sensitivity in the Everglades, in
EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION 357, 359 (Steven M. Davis & John C. Ogden
eds., St. Lucie Press 1994).
35. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF WATER, WATER QUALITY
TRADING

POLICY

STATEMENT

(2003),

available

at

http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/trading/upload/2008_09_12_watershed tradingjfinalpolicy200
3.pdf.
36. See Corey Longhurst, Where is the Point? Water Quality Trading's Inability to Deal with
Nonpoint Source Agricultural Pollution, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 175, 182 (2012) (noting use of
nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizer has grown dramatically since the 1960s).
37. See id. at 182 (stating it is difficult to trace pollution back to specific farms).
38. Id. at 178.
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permitting program found in section 402 of the Act.3 9 Section 301 of the
CWA prohibits "the discharge of any pollutant" to navigable waters from
point sources unless the discharge is in accordance with an NPDES
permit under section 402.40 This section creates what is in essence a
four-part test for determining whether a NPDES permit is required. A
NPDES permit is required for (1) any discharge (2) of a pollutant (3)
from a point source (4) into navigable waters.
The CWA does not contain a definition of "nonpoint source." The
EPA considers a "nonpoint source" to be "any source of water pollution
that does not meet the legal definition of 'point source' in section
502(14) of the Clean Water Act. 4' 1 Accordingly, any source that is not a
point source is a "nonpoint source." The definition of "point source"
found in section 502(14) of the CWA clearly excludes agricultural runoff:
[A]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation,
or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged. This term does not include agricultural
stormwater
42
discharges and returnflows from irrigatedagriculture.

Agricultural discharges that are excluded from the definition of PS
are not regulated under the NPDES program. In fact, the CWA does not
provide for any direct regulation of agricultural NPS pollution but
instead contemplates state planning and regulation to address NPS
pollution. Section 208 of the CWA calls for states to adopt "areawide
waste treatment management plans," which can include state controls on
NPS water pollution.43 Congress's intent to exclude agricultural NPS
from the NPDES program is further evidenced by the 1987 CWA
amendments, which brought certain stormwater discharges within the
purview of the NPDES program, but continued to exclude agricultural
stormwater discharges from the permitting program. 44

39. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012).
41. What is Nonpoint Source Pollution?, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (July
29, 2012), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/whatis.cfm.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012) (emphasis added).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2012).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 13 4 2 (p)( 2 ) (2012).
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B. Effluent Limitations and Water Quality Standards
An understanding of how the NPDES program has resulted in
significant reduction of PS pollution is necessary to see how efforts to
reduce NPS pollution have fallen short. PS discharges that meet the
four-part test are required to be authorized by NPDES permits issued by
a permitting authority---either the EPA or a state to which the EPA has
delegated the authority to implement the program.45 The permitting
authority must ensure that the NPDES permits it issues contain
limitations that both comply with specified technology-based standards
and assure compliance with state water-quality standards. Technologybased standards are established on an industry-wide basis to ensure that
polluters are reducing pollutants in their discharges to the extent
feasible. 46 The CWA provides for different types of technology-based
standards that apply with varying levels of stringency and differences in
the extent to which economic considerations are taken into account. A
number of factors, including the type of pollutants being discharged and
whether the source is considered a new source or whether it existed prior
to the implementation of the CWA, determine which technology-based
standards apply to a particular source.47 The federal EPA will survey the
particular industry to determine what pollution reduction technology is
available and feasible to establish a numeric performance standard for
that industry. The EPA adopts by rule the numeric performance standard
as a technology-based "effluent limitation guideline," which is included
in NPDES permits issued for sources in that particular industry.48 For
most of the history of the NPDES program these technology-based
performance standards included in NPDES permits as "effluent
limitations" have driven pollution reductions. Only recently, when it has
45.

33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012).

46.

J.B. Ruhl, Agriculture and Ecosystem Services: Paying Farmers to Do the New Right

Thing, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 249 (Angelo, Czamezki, & Eubanks, eds.,
2013). See also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-17, 1342 (2012).
47. Three different technology-based standards exist under the CWA. The applicable
technology is determined based on the type of pollutant discharged and whether the discharging
source is new or existing, JACKSON B. BATTLE & MAXINE I. LIPELES, WATER POLLUTION 167 (3d
ed. 1998). "Best available technology" is the technology-based standard applied to existing sources
of nonconventional and toxic pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(A) (2008). "Best conventional
technology" is applied to existing sources of conventional pollutants. Id. "Best available
demonstrated control technology" is the technology-based standard applied to new sources of water
pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1); see also BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 66 F.3d 784,
789-90 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining the different standards EPA uses to control pollutants under the
CWA). For an extensive overview of water law, see generally BATTLE & LIPELES, supra note 47.
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). See also 40 C.F.R. § 122.21 (2012).
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become apparent that imposing technology-based standards on PS
polluters is not sufficient to clean up many of the nation's waters, have
water quality standards (WQS) begun to play a much more significant
role for both PS and NPS pollution.
The CWA requires each state to establish WQS for each water body
within its jurisdiction. WQS are comprised of (1) a determination of
designated use; (2) water quality criteria; and (3) antidegradation
standards.49 In setting WQS, each state must first establish the
"designated use" of each water body within the state. 50 For example, in
the State of Florida, the state may designate a particular waterbody for
drinking water, for shellfish harvesting, for fishing and swimming, for
agricultural use, or for industrial use. Once the state has established the
designated use of a particular waterbody, it must develop water quality
criteria for particular pollutants necessary to protect that designated use.
Water quality criteria are typically presented as numeric criteria;
however, for nutrients, most states' water quality criteria are expressed in
a narrative form. 1
The intent of the CWA is that NPDES permits contain effluent
limitations that comply with both technology-based standards and water
quality standards. Where technology-based standards are not adequate to
protect a designated use, NPDES permits must contain water quality
based effluent limitations.52 Because NPS discharges are not subject to
NPDES permitting requirements, there is no federal tool for imposing
effluent limitations on NPS polluters. Nevertheless, as described below,
WQS are intended to protect designated uses from both NPS as well as
PS pollution.
C. Total Maximum Daily Loads
The CWA requires each state to identify the waterbodies within the
state for which "the effluent limitations ... are not stringent enough to
implement any water quality standard applicable to such waters" and to
rank such waterbodies based on priority, "taking into account the
severity of the pollution and the uses to be made of such waters., 53 The
CWA further directs each state to establish for "the waters identified in
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

BATTLE & LIPELES, supra note 47, at 182.
See id. at 182-83.
See id.
at 183-84.
See id. at 181-82.
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (2012).
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paragraph (1) (A) of this subsection, and in accordance with the priority
ranking," the total maximum daily load (TMDL). The TMDL is to be set
at "a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality standards
with seasonal variations and a margin of safety that takes into account
any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent
limitations and water quality., 54 States are required to submit to the EPA
the "waters identified and loads established" for review and approval by
the EPA. If disapproved, or if a state fails to develop the needed TMDLs
on a timely basis, the EPA will develop the TMDLs for the state.
TMDLs are the means by which water quality criteria can be
translated into water-quality based effluent limitations in NPDES
permits, or other types of pollution limitations under state regulatory
programs. As such, TMDLs play a critical role in protection of water
quality, particularly from NPS pollution.5 5 The CWA defines a TMDL
as the sum of allocated loads of pollutants, set at a level necessary to
implement the applicable WQS, including waste-load allocations from56
PS, load allocations from NPS, and natural background conditions.
Thus, TMDLs are to include both PS and NPS discharges.57 The CWA
also requires that a TMDL contain a "margin of safety" and take into
consideration "seasonal variations.
A TMDL represents, in essence, the amount of a particular pollutant
that a particular water body can assimilate without resulting in a
violation of a WQS. Despite the CWA's mandate that states develop
TMDLs starting in the 1970s, most states did not begin to establish
TMDLs until pressured to do so by litigation. Starting in the mid-1990s,
environmental organizations initiated a spate of lawsuits against the
federal EPA seeking to compel the EPA to adopt TMDLs in instances
where states had failed to do so. This litigation prompted many st/tes to
step up and begin to establish their own TMDLs in an effort to avoid the
federal EPA setting the TMDLs for them. 59 Although many states began
working on TMDLs in the mid-1990s, to date most states still have not
established TMDLs for many of the waterbodies within their

54.
55.

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2012).
For historical perspective on TMDLs, see OLIVER HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL

PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION (Envtl. Law Inst. ed., 2d ed. 2002).

56. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C); see also Ruhl, supra note 46 at 300-05 (discussing TMDLs).
57. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1139 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding EPA's
interpretation that section 303(d) applies even to waterbodies impaired only by NPS).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2012).
59. BATrLE & LIPELES, supranote 47, at 185.
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jurisdictions.
The process of establishing TMDLs can be extremely complex from
a scientific standpoint. Detailed water quality data is a necessary starting
point to understanding whether and to what extent a waterbody is
impaired. Complex modeling that takes into account factors such as
plant uptake of nutrients, the ability of soil to bind nutrients,
resuspension of nutrients from bottom sediments, dilution, currents and
flows, as well as many other factors, is typically used to predict the
assimilative capacity of the waterbody. For example, assume a state
designates a particular waterbody as a class III swimmable/fishable
waterbody and that the numeric water quality criteria for the nutrient
phosphorous is set as 55 parts per billion (ppb)-in other words, the
phosphorus concentration in that waterbody must be at or below 55 ppb
for that waterbody to meet its designation as a class III
fishable/swimmable water. Computer modeling will then be used to
determine how much of a load of phosphorous-i.e., how many pounds
of phosphorous can be discharged into that waterbody from all combined
sources each day without the phosphorous concentration of the
waterbody exceeding the 55 ppb criterion. In reality, loadings are
typically not established on a daily basis, but instead are set on an annual
basis. In this example, assume that based on the data and computer
modeling, the maximum annual loading of phosphorus that can be
discharged into the waterbody without violating the water quality criteria
designed to protect the designated use is fifteen tons per year (tpy). The
fifteen tpy, which represents the total maximum annual load for
phosphorus in that waterbody, must then be allocated among all sources
of phosphorous. States must go through this process of setting TMDLs
for every pollutant of concern in every water quality impaired waterbody
or waterbody segment in the state. In many states, this can mean
hundreds or even thousands of TMDLs must be established. This is an
enormous undertaking and thus it is not surprising that it is taking
considerable time for states to complete TMDL development, especially
during times of tight state government budgets.
Even after the daunting task of setting TMDLs is complete, the job is
not done. The next task is for the state to allocate each TMDL among all
PS and NPS dischargers. A full understanding of all of the existing
sources (including PS, NPS, atmospheric deposition, natural background
and release from sediments) of pollutant loading to a waterbody is
necessary to allocate a TMDL. TMDLs are allocated among PS
discharges by including an effluent limitation in the NPDES permit for
that source. TMDLs may require pollution reductions beyond what
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would be required using only technology-based effluent limitations in a
NPDES permit. 60 For NPS, including agricultural run-off, which is not
subject to NPDES permitting, the allocation and implementation of
TMDLs is much more challenging. Most NPS discharges are not
monitored or quantified. For the most part, states do not have detailed
data on the amount of pollutant loadings coming off of any particular
farm. Thus, the decision of what portion of a TMDL to allocate to a
particular farm is challenging. As a result, most states have chosen not
to make numerical allocations of TMDLs to farms.
Although establishing and allocating TMDLs is no easy matter,
perhaps the greatest challenge is implementing the TMDL. To date,
states have made little progress in reducing NPS discharges to meet
TMDLs even where TMDLs are in place. In 2000, the EPA proposed a
rule that would have required an implementation plan and funding source
as part of any state TMDL that the EPA approved. 61 The final rule was
adopted with an effective date of 2003. However, in 2003, the EPA
promulgated a rule withdrawing the 2000 revisions.62 This rule was
never finalized, and thus, TMDL implementation remains the
responsibility of the states. It is likely that a multifaceted, watershedbased approach that includes components such as: state regulation of
urban, suburban, and agricultural run-off; adoption of BMPs to reduce
pollutant loadings in stormwater and agricultural discharges; retrofitting
existing urban areas to treat stormwater; land acquisition programs to
protect riparian areas that provide the function of filtering pollutants
from run-off; wetland and water body restoration programs; and public
education will be needed to successfully implement TMDLs in most
locales.63 In geographic areas with significant agriculture, a variety of
regulatory and nonregulatory mechanisms including voluntary,
incentive-based, or mandatory BMPs, state permitting programs to limit
60. Id. at 184.
61. Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the Water
Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 9, 122, 123, 124, & 130).
62. For a discussion of the politics behind the 2000 rule and the 2003 withdrawal of the rule,
see Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLS and the Chesapeake
Bay, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10208, 10210 (2011) (describing how one of the first

acts of the Bush administration was to place the TMDL regulation on hold, thereby taking
implementation plans off the agenda).
63. See generally Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for the Clean Water Act's
Ambient Standards Program, 28 ENvTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS

10415, 10423 (1998)

(describing the new programs emerging from the EPA, states, and the federal government).
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agricultural discharges, farmer education and technical support, and
preservation of riparian vegetated buffers along waterbodies running
through or near agricultural lands must be considered.
D. Narrative and Numeric Nutrient Criteria
In many parts of the U.S., the two greatest water quality problems
from NPS run-off are excessive algal production which decreases water
clarity and decreases the abundance of rooted, submersed macrophyte
beds; and excessive sedimentation which degrades benthic habitats and,
through sediment resuspension, water quality. The causes of these
problems are largely nutrients, such as nitrogen and phosphorus, and
suspended matter.
A significant impediment to addressing nutrient problems is that,
unlike most other pollutants of concern, most states do not have numeric
water quality criteria for nutrients in place. Instead, most states rely on
"narrative criteria" that describe the effect of nutrients on waterbodies.
These narrative criteria do not provide a bright line for measuring
compliance. For example, until recently, the state of Florida relied solely
on the following narrative criteria that provide: "[i]n no case shall
nutrient concentrations of a body of water be altered so as to cause an
64
imbalance in natural populations of aquatic flora and fauna."
In other words, the Florida water quality criteria did not specify a
concentration at which phosphorus or nitrogen levels in a particular
waterbody would be considered a violation of state WQS. To determine
compliance, it was necessary to conduct a qualitative analysis to
determine whether nutrient concentrations were at unspecified levels that
would cause an "imbalance" in population of aquatic flora, primarily
algae, and fauna. Not only would numeric criteria provide a bright line
needed to measure compliance, it also could be an important step in
setting TMDLs for nutrients.
The extent to which the nutrient
concentrations in a waterbody deviate from the numeric nutrient criteria
for that waterbody is the first step in determining how much nutrient
loads must be reduced.
According to the most recent data provided by the EPA, only twentyfour states have adopted some form of numeric nutrient criteria. 61 Of
64.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.530(47)(b) (2013).

65. State Development of Numeric Criteria for Nitrogen and Phosphorous Pollution, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://cfpub.epa.gov/wqsits/nnc-development/ (last visited

Feb. 27, 2014).
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these twenty-four states, only one, Hawaii, is currently classified as
i designated for states that have a
achieving level 5 status, 66 which is
"complete set of N[itrogen] and P[hosphorous] criteria for all
watertypes. ' ,67 Only three states, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Florida,
are classified as level 4 states, which is a designation for states that have
' 68
"2 or more watertypes with N[itrogen] and/or P[hosphorous] criteria.
Three states, Minnesota, West Virginia, and Rhode Island, are classified
as level 3 states, which is a designation for states with "1 or more
watertype with N[itrogen] and/or P[hosphorous] criteria.' 69 Sixteen
states are classified as level 2, a designation for states with "some waters
with N[itrogen] and/or P[hosphorous] criteria.', 70 As of 2013, a slight
majority of states, twenty-six out of fifty, have failed to enact any
numeric nutrient criteria for any waterbodies within their territory; they
are designated as level 1.71
Projections provided by the states indicate that over the next three
years marginal progress will be made with respect to implementing
numeric nutrient criteria.72 By the end of 2014, Delaware, Minnesota,
and New York, are slated to become level 4 states, while Vermont is
projected to become the second level 5 state.73 By 2015, Mississippi,
Indiana, Ohio, New York, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania intend to
introduce numeric criteria for the first time, with Ohio intending to
Based on current numeric criteria
become a level 5 state.74
implementation and projections, by the end of 2016 nineteen states will
still have no numeric criteria for nitrogen and phosphorous pollution in
the waters of their territory.75
III. STATE APPROACHES
States have employed a number of different approaches to address

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Alphabetically as follows: Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South

Carolina, Vermont, Virginia.
71.

Id.

72.
73.

Id.
Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.
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pollution from agricultural run-off. The state approaches generally fall
into three broad categories: (1) voluntary programs, which frequently
include incentives such as financial or technical assistance from the state;
(2) market-based approaches, which include water quality trading
programs; and (3) direct regulation, which can include the direct
imposition of requirements such as the use of BMPs or other regulatory
requirements. To date, most states have relied heavily upon BMPs,
either through direct imposition or voluntary programs that incentivize
the use of BMPs. In recent years, some states have experimented with
using water quality trading programs as a way to further reduce water
quality degradation from agricultural run-off. These approaches, as
implemented, have met with very limited success.
A.

Voluntary Approaches

1. Best Management Practices
To date, most states have primarily relied on the use of BMPs to
address water quality degradation from agricultural run-off. Agricultural
BMPs "include soil and water conservation practices, other management
techniques, and social actions" designed to reduce water pollution runoff from agriculture.76 BMPs vary from crop to crop and by geographic
locale.
Many agricultural BMPs involve irrigation and water
management practices that are designed to reduce run-off.77 Common

BMPs designed to address nutrient run-off include reduced fertilizer
rates, time released fertilizer, and carefully timing fertilizer application to
avoid heavy rainfall. 8 Other BMPs seek to minimize the transport of
nutrients by using cover crops, conservation tillage and contour farming
to limit erosion, and by planting buffer strips and managing riparian
zones to trap nutrients and disperse run-off.79 The costs of implementing

BMPs can be high, particularly for practices that require installation of
structures, or very low, as with altered timing of fertilizer application. 0
The efficacy of BMPs varies greatly with the type of BMP and
geographic region.8'

76.

SHARPLEY ET AL., supra note 10, at ii.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 3-5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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Perhaps the greatest concern with BMPs is that even if they are
implemented by farmers, they may not reduce nutrient levels sufficiently
to achieve compliance with WQS. The efficacy of a particular BMP will
depend on a wide range of factors including BMP type, crop type, soil,
soil type, land slope, proximity to waterbodies, and amount and timing of
rainfall. Although a fair amount of research has been done on a number
of BMPs, there is a dearth of comprehensive data to demonstrate the
efficacy of different BMPs under varying conditions. Studies on BMP
efficacy show reductions of phosphorous ranging anywhere from 0% to
roughly 70%.82
Both the federal government and many states offer financial
incentives to farmers who voluntarily participate in BMP programs or
undertake pollution reduction measures. The primary federal program,
the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), is a voluntary
program, administered by the Natural Resources Conservation Service
(NRCS), which provides financial support and technical assistance to
agricultural producers. Through EQIP, the NRCS manages operational
plans designed to improve conservation and environmentally beneficial
agricultural practices.84 The National Water Quality Initiative (NWQI) is
a subprogram within EQIP that is designed to target specific important
watersheds throughout the U.S. 85 EQIP is implemented through the
recurring farm bills, which generally modify the limits and structure of
the program. 86
The 1996 farm bill (The Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996) set a limit of $10,000 per fiscal
year or $50,000 per multi-year contract for a conservation project under
EQIP.87 The 2002 farm bill (The Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act of 2002) increased the statutory limits of the EQIP program,
allowing for financial support of as much as $450,000 during the 20022007 fiscal years.88 Critics of the increased limits suggest that higher
82.
83.

Id. at 28.
Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main

/national/programs/fmancial/eqip (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
84. Id.
85. National Water Quality Initiative, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, NATURAL
RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/

programs/f'mancial/eqip/?cid=stelprdb 1047761 (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
86. Shauna R. Collins, Striking the Proper Balance Between the Carrot and the Stick
Approaches to Animal Feeding OperationRegulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 923, 954-55 (2012).
87. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, § 334
(1996) (amended by 2002 Farm Bill).
88. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 1240G (2002)
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limits favor Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs)."9 The
2008 farm bill (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008) reduced
the maximum level of financial support to $300,000, in theory decreasing
the maximum a laige CAFO might recoup through EQIP. 90 However,
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture may waive the cap
in situations of special environmental significance, in which case the cap
may be raised to a maximum $450,000. 9'
It is difficult to assess whether the increases in EQIP limits is a net
positive or negative for the environment. It seems rational to conclude
that the increase in overall funding for EQIP (approximately $200
million in 1996 to approximately $1.75 billion in 2008) has had a
positive impact on environmental quality, at least in targeted areas. 92
However, CAFOs are regulated under the CWA and might be forced into
conservation practices without the financial assistance provided through
EQIP. If the USDA concentrated EQIP funding on small-scale farming
operations, CAFOs would still be required to meet applicable
Technology Based Effluent Limitations or Water Quality Based Effluent
Limitations. Assuming the funding for EQIP remained at the current
statutory levels, the federal financial assistance would be freed to assist
non-CAFO agricultural operations.
2. Payments for Ecosystem Services
Another tool that a government might employ in an effort to improve
water quality is Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES). PES can
represent a broad range of incentive-based government programs;
however, a traditional PES program involves providing financial support
for landowners (particularly agricultural) in exchange for some
prescribed environmentally positive action. While modem, large-scale
commercial agriculture is associated with negative environmental
impacts, agriculture in a responsibly managed system can provide
significant positive ecosystem services. 93 A responsibly managed
(amended by 2008 Farm Bill).
89. See, e.g., MARTHA NOBLE, PAYING THE POLLUTERS: FACTORIES FEAST ON TAXPAYER
SUBSIDIES 223 (2010), available at http://www.cafothebook.org/download/CAFOPaying_
thePolluters.pdf.
90. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 2508 (2008)
(amended by the 2014 Farm Bill).
91. Id.
92. Collins, supra note 86, at 954.
93. Ruhl, supranote 46, at 245-46.
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agricultural system, funded in part with PES money, may provide buffer
areas between pollutant generators and riparian waters, cleaner aquifer
recharge areas, and native habitats for indigenous flora and fauna.94
One benefit of the PES tool is that it is preventative in nature, as
compared to many contemporary reactive measures. Instead of having to
expend tremendous sums of collected tax money building treatment
facilities, it is likely more economically efficient to pay the farmers to
implement ecologically beneficial services. 95 For example, in central
Florida, a PES program is directed at a large cattle industry, which is
largely responsible for increased nutrient loading into Lake Okeechobee
and eventually the sensitive Everglades.96 Funding under the PES
program is used to pay ranchers for services that reduce phosphorous
loading. 97 This and other PES programs can be mutually beneficial, as
farmers can secure a consistent stream of payments while the regulating
government can reduce expenditures associated with the clean-up of
polluted waters.98
The main drawback for PES programs is the need for consistent
funding from either the federal or state government. One potential
solution is to use money that traditionally went to farmers based on
production and instead direct it towards providing financial assistance for
providing ecologically beneficial services. As one author notes, we have
already made a policy choice to pay farmers-the only philosophy
change needed is to shift from a policy based on paying for quantity
production
to a more holistic approach of paying for ecosystem
99
services.

B. Market-BasedApproaches
In recent years, several states have been experimenting with marketbased approaches to reduce NPS pollution. Several states have either
implemented or are in the process of developing Water Quality Credit
Trading (Trading) programs. Trading programs are designed to decrease
pollution from both PS and NPS polluters.'0 0 In theory, Trading

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 241.
See, e.g., Longhurst, supra note 36, at 183-84 ("Under California law, all dischargers are
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programs allocate costs associated with the abatement or mitigation of
water pollution in an economically efficient manner.' 1
Trading
programs are promising because they are market-based theories that
potentially allow for greater flexibility,
reduced costs for polluters, and
102
increased environmental benefits.
The underlying premise is that PS polluters have been regulated to a
point where any additional abatement will require sophisticated, costly
techniques. Alternatively, since NPS pollution is not significantly
regulated, there are cheaper abatement techniques that can be
implemented. Under a Trading program, a NPS polluter (or PS polluter)
implements an abatement technique that decreases the amount of
discharge from his or her source. This action generates a credit that may
be sold in an open market to a PS polluter that is struggling to find
economical ways to abate pollution. These actions allow for society to
realize the most economically efficient abatement of pollutants.
In 2003, the EPA issued a policy statement that explains specific
parameters a state Trading program must follow in order to receive EPA
support. 10 3 The purpose of the policy statement was "to encourage states,
interstate agencies and tribes to develop and implement water quality
[T]rading programs for nutrients, sediments and other pollutants where
opportunities exist to achieve water quality improvements at reduced
costs." 1° 4 Specifically, the EPA sought to create voluntary incentive
programs by which PS and NPS polluters are incentivized to reduce
pollution in order to generate credits that they may sell in an open
market.'05
1. Florida's Water Quality Trading Program
In 2008, the Florida Legislature authorized a pilot Trading program
in the lower St. Johns River Basin. 10 6 The Florida Department of
covered under the Peter Cologne Act, including both point and nonpoint source dischargers.").
101. Id. at 193.
102. Id. at 189.
103.

See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF WATER, WATER QUALITY

TRADING POLICY (2003), available at http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/trading/upload/
2008 09 12 watershed-tradingfinalpolicy2003.pdf.
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id.
106. Div. OF ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION IN FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., THE PILOT
WATER QUALITY CREDIT TRADING PROGRAM FOR THE LOWER ST. JOHNS RIVER: A REPORT TO THE

GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE (2010), available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/wqssp/docs/
WaterQualityCreditReport-101410.pdf [hereinafter ST. JOHNS RIVER PILOT TRADING PROGRAM].

2014]

MAINTAINING A HEALTHY WATER SUPPLY

1023

Environmental Protection (DEP) promulgated regulations to implement
the pilot project. Credits generated by PS polluters must be verified
through effluent monitoring. 07 Credits generated by NPS polluters can
be either measured through effluent monitoring or through, estimation, so
long as the estimation is coupled with reasonable assurances and an
uncertainty factor is applied to the estimation. 0 8 The quantity of credits
generated by a PS polluter is the amount the source's load is reduced
below the baseline established for the source. 0 9 For a NPS polluter to
generate a credit, it must reduce its load by more than what is expected
following the implementation of applicable BMPs, which are required
under the Basin Management Action Plan (BMAP) for that source. 1 o
The requirements are designed to ensure that the Trading program is one
in which a polluter must go above and beyond the baseline level of
pollution reduction (BMP or load allocation) before it is capable of
generating credits. A farmer wishing to generate a credit under the
current rule would have to implement all required BMPs and further
implement an additional action designed to reduce the amount of
pollutant discharge.
The DEP rule sets forth five eligible ways to generate credits. A
credit may be generated by: (a) installing or modifying water pollution
control equipment, (b) implementing operational changes or modifying a
process that results in a reduction of nutrient load discharge, (c)
implementing NPS management controls, (d) installing and operating
drainage projects designed to control stormwater, and (e) similar control
methods that demonstrate an ability to reduce nutrient loading.''
Additionally, three activities that are not eligible as ways to generate
credits include: (a) reducing loading as required through a regulatory
program, (b) changing the land use by either taking agricultural use off
the land or changing crops grown, and (c) implementing BMPs which are
required under the BMAP.11 2 These requirements ensure that credits are
only generated for actions that reduce nutrient loading and are not
107.

Id. at 21.

108.

Id.

109. Id.
110. See id. A Basin Management Area Plan (or Basin Management Action Plan) is a
"comprehensive set of strategies" that are used by a Water Management District to implement the
pollutant reduction requirements imposed by a Total Maximum Daily Load. Basin Management
Action Plans, FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT. (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/water

sheds/bmap.htm.
111. ST. JoHNs RIVER PILOT TRADING PROGRAM, supra note 106, at 23.
112.

Id.
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attributable to mandated reductions or voluntary abandonment of a prior
land use.
Additionally, traders may be required to use uncertainty ratios when
the proposed trade involves the generation of a credit by a NPS. "3 For
agricultural run-off, the uncertainty ratio is 3:1, meaning that a potential
credit-generating NPS must decrease its discharge by three pounds in
order to generate a one pound credit. 1 4 While designed to avoid "paper
reductions" and promote meaningful reductions in pollutant discharge,
this policy may stifle trading as it makes participation in the Trading
program less economically beneficial.
The majority of trades that occurred under the pilot Trading program
were transacted before the implementation of the TMDL requirements in
the BMAP." 5 Additionally, an overwhelming majority of the credits
were generated by municipal waste-water treatment facilities (WWTF),
PS polluters. 1 6 The majority of these credit-generating WWTFs traded
excess credits to Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System facilities." 7
Finally, all eleven of the documented pre-TMDL trades occurred intramunicipality; for example, City of Green Cove Springs WWTFs traded
1,029.2 pounds per year to the City of Green8 Cove Springs (Municipal
Separate Storm Sewer System) MS4 facility."
Only three trades were generated after the initial allocation of
credits." 9 All three of the post-BMAP trades were similar to the preBMAP trades.12 0 The DEP attributes the lack of trades to uncertainty
surrounding the EPA's numeric nutrient criteria.' 2' The main concern
expressed by the DEP is whether the EPA's numeric nutrient criteria will
be based on "loads" or "concentrations.' ' 22 If the criteria allow for
specific quantities of loading, by individual polluters, then the Trading
program is more likely to succeed. 123 Allowing specific load quantities

113. Id.at 12.
114. Id.
115. Id.at 8 ("[E]ntities were given the option of trading allocations before the BMAP was
adopted.").
116. See id.
at 10-11 (listing trading program statistics).
117. Id.
118. Id.at 10.
119. Id.at 11.
120. See id. (discussing the requirement that entities submit an affidavit to verify compliance
with the original BMAP purpose).
121. See id at 15-16 (listing four ways nutrient criteria create confusion over limits).
122. Id. at 15.
123. Id.at 16.
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would permit polluters to target their discharges with a variety of specific
quantifiable reductions, whereas a standard based on concentration levels
would be more difficult to reliably predict and implement. The lack of
trades generated after the initial allocation gives pause to whether the
Trading program can be effective throughout the entire state of Florida.
In 2013, the Florida Legislature enacted a bill that expands the pilot
Trading program. The legislature granted the DEP the discretion to
authorize a Trading program in an area where there is a BMvAP
established. 124 Participation in a Trading program is voluntary and the
25
DEP is not allowed to participate in the establishment of credit prices. 1
As the statutory requirements that guided the DEP's Trading rules
remain the same, it is likely that the rules promulgated to implement the
expanded Trading program will be similar in scope.
Positive and negative implications can be drawn from the pilot
Trading program on the lower St. Johns River Basin. There was some
initial trading between WWTF and MS4 facilities, which shows that a
trading system can work to allocate pollution reduction to sources where
it is most economically feasible. However, the relative lack of trading
post-TMDL enactment may show that both PS and NPS polluters found
the Trading program economically unattractive. Since zero credits were
generated by agricultural NPS polluters, it is difficult to draw a
conclusion about the prospects of the program going forward. If the
rules promulgated by the DEP are similar to the ones that regulated the
pilot Trading program, then perhaps familiarity with the rules will foster
increased interest in the program. It is likely that the only real way to
increase the participation of NPS polluters in the Trading program is to
prove to NPS polluters that it is in their financial interest to participate.
Community outreach programs would likely be a good place to start.
2.

Great Miami Water Quality Trading Program

The Great Miami Trading Program is one of the largest Trading
programs in the U.S. 126 The Great Miami River Watershed (Watershed)
is located in southwestern Ohio and covers a land area of approximately
4,000 square miles. 127 As of 2003, there were approximately 1,000
124. 2013 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2013-146 (C.S.C.S.H.B. 713) (West).
125. Id.
126. David A. Newburn & Richard T. Woodward, An Ex Post Evaluation of Ohio's Great
Miami Water Quality Trading Program, 48 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 156, 156 (2012).
127. Id. at 158.
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farmers in the Watershed. 128 Approximately 70% of the land use in the
Watershed is dedicated to agricultural uses, predominantly row-crop
production of corn, soybeans, and wheat.12 9 Additionally, livestock
operations---consisting of beef cattle and dairy-exist in the
Watershed. 130 In 2003, of the approximately 1,000 stream miles included
131
within the Watershed, over 40% did not meet applicable standards.
The Watershed's water resources are32 monitored and managed by the
Miami Conservancy District (MCD).1
In anticipation of potential TMDL levels being set for waters within
the Watershed, the MCD began looking for ways to achieve costeffective pollution reduction strategies. 133 A report prepared for the
MCD suggested that pollution reductions achieved from the
implementation of agricultural BMPs may be as much as thirty times
achieved from regulated PS
cheaper than similar pollution reductions
134
polluters (predominantly WWTFs).
A Trading program established in the Watershed became operational
in 2006.135 A $1 million grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
Natural Resource Conservation Service provided a financial boost to get
WWTFs contributed more
the Trading program operational. 36 By 2010,
137
than $1.2 million to the Trading program.
The heart of the Trading program is that farmers (NPS polluters)
voluntarily reduce levels of pollution through the implementation of
BMPs. 138 The farmers, with the help of their local soil and water
conservation district, submit projects to the MCD, which are reviewed
and either accepted or denied. 139 Credits are calculated based on the
projected annual sum of nitrogen and phosphorous reductions multiplied
by the number of years for which the contract is to run. 140 Proposed

128.
129.
130.
131.
aquatic
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (explaining that the stream miles did "not meet federal standard[s] for attaining
life").
Id. at 157.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id.
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projects for credit generation are accompanied by requested prices, set by
the farmers. 14' This is a type of reverse auction in which the MCD
period of time (Round) that are below a
accepts all bids during a given
142
maximum acceptable price.
As the Trading program has unfolded, data suggests that farmers
have discovered a dollar point at which projects will be accepted,
allowing them to maximize profit while ensuring approval from the
MCD. 143 In the final documented Round of bids, fifty projects were
proposed and 100% were accepted, a significant increase over the
program's 45% history of successful bids. 144 While this may show an
increase in efficiency of bidding, it might also indicate a system in which
the participants have discovered a fixed price at which they can be
assured of receiving a maximum bid. This outcome might not be per se
negative; however, it runs counter to the proposed benefit of a Trading
program, which is to achieve an economically efficient result.
A second major concern with the Trading program is that a
significant amount of the money that was used to fund the program came
from a federal grant. It is questionable as to whether the program could
have gotten off the ground or continued without the initial $1 million
grant from the federal government. However, it is promising that since
the inception of the Trading program, WWTFs have contributed over
$1.2 million.
A third concern with the Trading program (and Trading programs in
general) is that it might result in no net improvement to WQS. If the
goal is to improve the water quality within the Watershed, it might make
more sense to use the grant from the federal government to directly fund
the implementation of BMPs by agricultural producers. This would
likely reduce pollutant discharge from non-regulated NPS polluters while
still forcing regulated PS polluters to find ways to reduce their discharges
to meet NPDES requirements.
3. Major Shortcomings of Water Quality Trading Programs
Optimism concerning the potential for Trading programs to
meaningfully improve the condition of impacted waterbodies should be
tempered for a number of reasons. As compared to the relatively
141.

Id.

142.

Id.

143.

Id. at 163.

144.

Id.
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successful Acid Rain Program (ARP), water quality Trading programs
must contend with145significantly different environmental, geographic, and
economic factors.
In 1990 Congress amended the Clean Air Act (CAA) to implement a
market-based trading program with the goal of reducing sulfur dioxide
(SO 2) emissions to 10 million tons below 1980 levels. 146 Through the
ARP, a final cap of 8.95 million tons of SO 2 emissions is set from the
year 2010 and prospectively. 147 The cap is imposed on Electric
Generating Units (EGUs), which are mainly power plants burning coal,
oil, and gas to produce electricity. 148 The limit of 8.95 million tons
149
represents a nearly 50% reduction from SO2 output in the 1980s.
While a 50% reduction in SO 2 output might seem like a daunting goal,
the most recent data indicates that EGUs as a whole are in compliance
with the national limits.' 50 In 2009 EGUs emitted approximately 5.7
million tons of SO 2, a full 3.8 million tons below the existing cap of 9.5
million tons.' 5 1 The 2009 emissions levels represented a 67% reduction
from the emission of 17.3 million tons in 1980.152
Substantial differences exist between the ARP and current models of
water quality Trading programs. First, the ARP had a broad geographic
scope, whereas most Trading programs are limited to specific
watersheds. The ARP was a regional program, covering pollution
generating plants in over twenty states. 153 Trading programs are
implemented by individual states and generally encompass a smaller
scope, such as a specific watershed or segment of a waterbody. Trading
programs encompass smaller geographic zones, which reduces the
potential impact of any single water quality Trading program.
Second, the underlying regulatory coverage of the CAA is
substantially more comprehensive than the coverage of the CWA. The
ARP regulates "[a]ll units over 25 megawatts and new units under 25
megawatts that use fuel with a sulfur content greater than .05 percent by
145.

Longhurst, supra note 36, at 190-193.

146.

Acid Rain Program, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (July 25, 2012),

http://www.epa.gov/airmarket/progsregs/arp/basic.html.
147. Emission and Compliance Data, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 20,
2012), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/ARP09_ I.html.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151.

Id.

152.
153.

Id.
Acid Rain Program,supra note 146.
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weight .... ,15 4
Conversely, the CWA regulates PS through the
implementation of the NPDES program. 155 NPS are for the most part
unregulated by the CWA, which leaves potential regulation up to the
individual states. The lack of a comprehensive regulatory program
discourages the application of a Trading program in the context of water
pollution. NPS polluters, most significantly agriculture, can decide
whether to opt-in to the Trading program. While the promise of
economic benefit may be enough to induce some participation, the lack
of any underlying requirement to engage in pollution reduction practices
leaves this decision entirely up to individual polluters.
Third, the monitoring of pollution-generating entities under the ARP
is substantially more cost-effective and prevalent than monitoring of
pollution generating entities under water quality Trading programs. The
ARP provides for specific monitoring requirements, which are to be
tracked for all participating entities. 15 6 Generally, Trading programs rely
on less comprehensive monitoring requirements. 157 For regulated PS
polluters, data can reasonably be gathered from effluent monitoring,
158
which is likely already required to satisfy the NPDES permit.
However, if NPS agriculture producers participate in the Trading
program, their pollution reductions are calculated using less exact
measures. For example, the Trading program in the Great Miami River
Watershed allocates load reduction based on BMPs, not effluent
monitoring. 59 The lack of certainty surrounding monitoring pollution
abatement can be addressed by the implementation of uncertainty
ratios. 16
Uncertainty ratios increase the cost of participating in a
Trading program, however, they are implemented in order to ensure the
credits generated are tied to actual reductions and not paper reductions.
There is substantially more uncertainty for trading under a water quality
program as compared to the more stable ARP. This uncertainty reduces
the attractiveness of water quality Trading programs as a policy choice

154.

Continuous Emissions Monitoring Fact Sheet, U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

AGENCY (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/airmarket/emissions/continuous-factsheet.html.
155.

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY (Mar. 12, 2009), http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/.
156. Acid Rain Program,supranote 146.
157.

See ST. JOHNS RIVER PILOT TRADING PROGRAM, supra note 106, at 12-13 (2010)

(outlining conditions that would apply to trades under a pilot water quality credit Trading program in
Florida).
158. Id.
159. Newburn & Woodward, supra note 126, at 157.
160. Id. at 166.
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and for potential participants.
Another major concern regards striking the right balance in order to
properly incentivize trading between NPS polluters and PS polluters.
This concern is highly dependent upon the load allocations under TMDL
regulations. If the PS only need to offset a minimal amount of pollution
then they will be less likely to participate in the Trading program. If the
required reductions are significant and agricultural producers can offset
the pollution at a significantly cheaper cost then trades may be generated.
One important factor in the success of a Trading program is that
TMDL levels be set. The TMDL acts as the "cap," which is necessary
for a Trading program to function as a typical cap and trade program. If
no cap exists then there is no incentive for any of the participants in the
system to participate in a pollution trading scheme. One interesting
approach, taken by the MCD in the Great Miami Water Quality Trading
Program was to differentiate polluters based on when they entered the
trading system. 161 WWTFs that participated in the Trading program
before TMDL requirements are finalized are termed "Investors" whereas
WWTFs participating after the TMDL implementation are titled
"Contributors."' 162
The MCD rewards Investors (or punishes
Contributors) by permitting Investors to trade credits for pollution at a
more favorable rate. 63 Investors may trade one pound for one credit
when discharging into "attained" waters and one pound for two credits
when discharging into "impaired" waters. 164 Contributors trade at a less
favorable rate of one pound for two credits when discharging into
attained waters and one pound for three credits when discharging into
impaired waters. 165 This approach might encourage WWTFs to invest in
the Trading program, especially when TMDLs are foreseeable in the near
future.
It is also important to note that a Trading program does not
inherently lead to meaningful reductions in water pollution. If Company
A pays farmer B $10 in exchange for a one pound credit generated from
the implementation of a BMP, Company A retains the right to use that
credit by polluting one pound more pollutant than they are allotted under
TMDLs. The main goal of the Trading program is to allocate the costs in
a more efficient manner, easing the burden on the regulated parties.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 159.
Id.
Id.

164.

Id.

165.

Id-

2014]

MAINTAINING A HEALTHY WATER SUPPLY

1031

C. DirectRegulation
Many states have programs that promote or incentivize the use of
agricultural BMPs. However, to date, very few programs have been
adopted that require the use of BMPs or any other specific agricultural
NPS pollution reduction measures. Some states, however, have in
essence indirectly required the use of BMPs by creating "safe harbors,"
wherein the use of prescribed BMPs creates a presumption of compliance
with TMDLs and WQS. An example of this type of safe harbor can be
found in the Florida Watershed Restoration Act.1 66 This sets up a
process in which the Florida Department of Agricultural and Consumer
67
Services (FDACS) identifies and adopts BMPs for agricultural NPS.1
The Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) must verify
that BMPs are effective at reducing pollutant loading. Once the BMPs
are verified and adopted by rule, agricultural producers who voluntarily
implement the BMPs receive a "presumption of compliance" with
Specifically, the statute requires that the rules include
WQS.168
provisions for a Notice of Intent (NOI) to implement the BMPs and some
mechanism to ensure implementation. The statute grants a presumption
of compliance with state WQS to people who sign a NOI.169 For
agricultural producers who choose not to sign a NOI, the statute requires
they monitor water quality on their own as prescribed by the department
or a water management district. 170 The law also allows a NPS discharger
to participate in water quality credit trading in7 order to "demonstrate
compliance" with required pollution reductions.'1
Once an agricultural producer signs a NOI, regulations contain
general provisions requiring the BMPs to be properly implemented. For
example, the rule adopted requiring a NOI from people who fall within
the purview of the Vegetable and Agronomic Crops BMP manual
provides that the "identified practices shall include the nutrient
management practices listed in the manual that are applicable to the
operation covered by the Notice of Intent. These nutrient management
practices shall be initiated as soon as practicable after submittal of the

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.067 (West 2013).
Id. § 403.067(7)(c)(2).
Id. § 403.067(7)(c)(3).
Id. § 403.067(7)(c)(2).
Id. § 403.067(7)(b)(2)(g).
Id.
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Notice of Intent." 172
The Florida safe harbor approach to BMPs, on its face, appears to
strike a reasonable balance between achieving nutrient pollution
reduction and not imposing too onerous a burden on farmers.
Nevertheless, there are a number of significant shortcomings to this
approach and to solely relying on BMPs to address agricultural water
pollution reduction. One shortcoming arises from the specific regulatory
structure created pursuant to the Florida Watershed Restoration Act and
its anemic command that farmers whose practices fall within the BMP
manual's scope "shall reasonably attempt to implement the following
BN4Ps . ... 17 The manual backs away from a strong implementation
requirement even further when it states "[d]epending upon the farm's site
specific conditions, all of these baseline BMPs need not be implemented.
Only implement those BMPs applicable for your location and production
system."' 74 At a certain level, the limitation on the need for farmers to
implement every one of these BMPs makes sense. If, for instance, a
particular farming operation has no natural bodies of water or other
environmentally sensitive areas adjacent to their land, then commanding
them to implement filter strips and riparian buffers makes no sense. On
another level, however, those clauses could provide gaping loopholes for
farmers who simply do not want to be burdened by the implementation
of BMPs.
For example, a vegetable farmer may prefer broadcast fertilizer
application (spreading fertilizer at a relatively even rate across an entire
field) to banding (placing fertilizer in bands right in the root-zone of the
plants). Theoretically, he could argue that he is not required to band his
fertilizer because banding does not conform to his production system and
the language of the BMP manual appears to support this argument.
There does not seem to be any effective mechanism within the NOI to
actually require implementation of any additional BMPs that a farmer is
not already utilizing in their management practices at the time the NOI is
signed. While each state approach described above has some merit, to
date none has resulted in significant improvements in water quality on a
large scale. Thus, additional approaches should be considered.
172.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5M-8.004 (2006).

173. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, VEGETABLE AND
AGRONOMIC
CROPS
BMP
MANUAL
(2005)
(emphasis
added),
available at
http://www.freshfromflorida.com/content/
download/32110/789059/BmpVeggieAgroCrops2005.pdf.
174.
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Nutrient run-off from agricultural operations is one of the most
challenging sources of water quality degradation to address. A healthy
and robust agricultural system is critical to the U.S. economy, to food
security, and to farmers who typically operate on small profit margins.
Thus, there are important policy reasons for not imposing too heavy an
economic burden on agriculture to address water quality concerns. On
the other side of the coin, however, is the important public policy goal of
having water clean enough to protect human health and the natural
environment, including economic resources such as fisheries and
recreational values. Although reducing nutrient rum-off from agriculture
will be a challenging and likely costly endeavor, it will17be
less costly to
5
treat the cause of the problem than eutrophication itself.
As described above, the federal CWA does not provide for direct
federal regulation of most agricultural NPS water pollution. Thus, the
individual states are left with the responsibility of addressing these
concerns. To date, most states have only made modest forays into
regulatory and incentive-based programs for agricultural water pollution.
A number of challenges have presented barriers to more serious efforts.
Barriers include: (1) the lack of existing numerical nutrient criteria; (2)
the technical difficulty and resources needed to determine how much of a
particular pollutant, such as nitrogen or phosphorus, that a particular
waterbody can assimilate without resulting in a violation of water quality
standards; (3) the lack of farm run-off monitoring; 176 (4) the limitations
of BMPs; (5) inadequate incentives for farmers to reduce and mange
nutrients; and (6) insufficient funding for research and implementation of
BMPs and other nutrient management mechanisms. Each of these
challenges must be addressed to achieve the substantial nutrient pollution
reduction that will be needed to clean up the nation's waterways. To do
this, a multifaceted approach that includes monitoring of run-off,
numeric performance standards, regional treatment systems, and sources
of funding for incentives and construction of regional systems is
warranted.

175.

SHARPLEY ET AL., supra note 10, at 3.

176.

Id.at l.
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A. Run-Off Monitoring
One of the most important aspects of any program geared toward
reducing nutrient pollution from agricultural NPS is the implementation
of monitoring programs. Without monitoring data it is impossible to
know how much of any particular pollutant is coming off of any
particular farm. Monitoring data could help to identify which farms are
the most significant contributors of nutrient run-off and thus the most in
need of the imposition of BMPs or other measures to reduce run-off.
Moreover, monitoring data could help to quantify the efficacy of various
BMPs and to determine conditions under which the use of particular
BMPs is most effective. Finally, if states begin to impose numeric
performance standards or to allocate specific portions of TMDLs to
specific agricultural operations, it will be necessary to have monitoring
data. Without knowing the amount of pollution being contributed by a
particular farm, it is difficult to determine how much of a TMDL to
allocate to that farm.
NPS pollution is inherently more difficult to monitor than PS
pollution.' 77 Numerous geographic, topographic, and climate-related
variables impact the run-off and the ability to effectively monitor the
effluent.' 78 Additionally, costs for monitoring systems of NPS may be
greater because the area to be measured is generally larger in size than
those required for a discrete PS polluter. 179 One potential improvement
to assist in monitoring NPS pollution is to turn what is diffuse into
discrete, by containing run-off within conveyance systems.
If
agricultural NPS polluters can implement drainage systems that collect
run-off, instead of allowing it to run off in a diffuse manner, then it is
likely that the costs of monitoring nutrient run-off will decrease.
Monitoring is important for water quality Trading programs.
Multiple Trading programs require the application of an uncertainty ratio
when trades are generated from NPS to PS polluters. These ratios
generally range anywhere from 1:1 up to 3:1. Uncertainty ratios require
additional pollution abatement from a credit generating NPS, in order to
make up for the fact that there is inherent uncertainty when monitoring
NPS pollution. 80 The result of uncertainty ratios is to make Trading
177.
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programs less economically beneficial for NPS credit generators,
diminishing the potential positive impacts of the Trading program. The
ability to adequately monitor run-off would eliminate the need for
relying on imprecise uncertainty ratios, resulting in a better economic
outcome for NPS credit traders.
B. Numeric PerformanceStandards
There are two primary approaches to standard-setting for pollution
reduction. The first approach is to establish performance standards,
typically expressed in numeric form. To be in compliance with a
performance standard, the polluter must demonstrate that the pollution
discharge meets a specified level of "performance," regardless of how it
is accomplished. Numeric performance-based standards for categories of
industry are included in NPDES permits issued for PS discharges under
the CWA. For example, the EPA has established by rule effluent
limitation guidelines for the textile mills point source category, wool
scouring subcategory. For existing sources in this industrial category
that have PS discharges, the EPA has set numeric performance-based
standards based on the pollutant discharge reduction attainable with the
use of the "best practicable control technology currently available," also
known as "Best Available Technology (BAT)."' 18 1 For instance, if a PS
within this category discharges total suspended solids (TSS), the standard
is a maximum of 32.2 pounds of TSS per 1000 pounds of wool per
day. 182 This numeric standard is included in NPDES permits issued for
these discharges. Dischargers are then free to choose which technology
or other pollution reduction measures they desire, provided that such
measures result in discharges not exceeding the specified daily limit.
This approach has proven
extremely effective for PS discharges under
83
the NPDES program. 1
The second type of standard is the design standard. Design standards

RATION DETERMINATION FROM TMDL ALLOCATION PROCESS 1 (2006), available at http://www.

environmental-expert.com/Files/5306/articies/1 1867/309.pdf.
181. 40 C.F.R. § 410.12(a) & (b) (2012).
182. Id.
183. Anne G. Short & Timothy P. Duane, Regulatory Spillover: How Regulatory Programs
Influence Voluntary Efforts to Adopt Best Management Practices to Manage Non-Point Source
Pollution, 35 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 37, 55-56 (2011). See also Houck, supra note 63, at
193 (explaining that, "[w]ithin the first years of application of BAT to industrial and municipal
sources pollution loadings dropped precipitously," and "[r]eceiving water quality improved by
29%").
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prescribe the use of particular pollution control technology or
management. Under this approach, a discharger meets the standard
provided if it uses the specified technology, regardless of the actual
performance or amount of pollution being discharged. BMPs-whether
voluntary, incentivized, or mandated-are examples of design standards.
As described in detail in this article, to date, BMPs adopted by NPS
dischargers have not achieved significant widespread pollution reduction
and vary greatly in their efficacy depending on a variety of factors such
as soils, geology, location, and climatic conditions. Given the success of
performance standards and relative lack of success for design standards
for water pollution reduction, it is worth considering whether, at least in
certain circumstances, performance standards would be more effective in
the NPS arena.
Performance standards offer many benefits. Performance standards
ensure greater certainty that, if met, they will actually accomplish the
desired water quality improvements. In comparison, because design
standards contain so many factors that can influence efficacy, they may
or may not accomplish the desired pollution reduction. In addition,
performance standards establish a bright line that makes it easy for both
dischargers and regulatory agencies to determine whether the discharger
is in compliance, and this simplifies the compliance enforcement
process. Performance standards have the added benefit of encouraging
innovation-the use of newer technology with improved efficiency and
effectiveness. It is in the interest of dischargers who must meet
performance standards to develop cheaper and better technology and
other pollution reduction measures. Once dischargers develop better
technologies, others could adopt these innovations, and this could result
in widespread success.
Finally, a major benefit of the numeric
performance standard is that it facilitates trading programs. Dischargers
who perform better than the specified performance standards will have
easily measured pollutant reductions that can be used to determine the
The use of numerical
number of credits available for trading.
performance standards rather than design standards will make it easier to
determine the number of credits without the need for estimates and the
application of uncertainty factors. Thus, dischargers will have more
certainty in determining whether pollution reduction measures will be
cost effective in the trading market and regulatory agencies will have
more certainty in tracking credit trading.
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C. Regional Treatment Systems
Due to the variability of BMP efficacy and the costs of farm-by-farm
regulation and run-off treatment, regional nutrient management and runoff treatment may be more efficient and effective in many situations.
Although certain agricultural operations-such as grain farms-are often
very large, some farms-including many vegetable farms, family farms
and organic farms-are of a much smaller scale. For regions that have
multiple small farms, the imposition of numeric performance standards
on each farm may be overly burdensome. An alternative approach could
be "regional treatment systems" in which run-off from multiple farms is
collected and treated. Compliance with numeric performance standards
would be measured at the point of discharge from the regional treatment
system. By collecting discharge from multiple farms in a particular
watershed into one regional treatment system, farmers can share costs
and take advantage of economies of scale. Currently, efforts are
underway in Florida to collect run-off from a number of farms in one
region and treat the water collectively. The farms there are already
implementing BMPs and thus reducing nutrient run-off to some extent
before the water enters the regional treatment system. However, BMPs
are not sufficient to achieve desired reductions. Thus, the collected runoff flows through a regional treatment system that can significantly
reduce nutrient levels beyond what was accomplished with BMPs.
The most successful, albeit extremely costly, example of a regional
treatment system is in the Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA), located
south of Lake Okeechobee in south Florida. The EAA sits between Lake
Okeechobee and the state and federal lands that comprise the core of the
Florida Everglades. The EAA consists of approximately 640,000 acres
of agricultural land. Pursuant to statute, the farms in the EAA are
required to implement BMPs. 184 BMPs have reduced phosphorous
loadings by approximately 55%. 185 However, this reduction was
insufficient to reduce phosphorous levels to the 10 ppb water quality
criteria that applies in the Everglades. Thus, Florida has constructed
Stormwater Treatment Areas (STAs) on approximately 63,000 acres
NPDES permits containing numeric
south of the EAA farms.
performance standards are required for the PS discharges from the STAs.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.4592(4)() (West 2013).
185. JENNIFER LEEDS, SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, STORMWATER
TREATMENT AREAS & EVERGLADES RESTORATION (2012), available at http://waterinstitute.ufl.edu/
symposium20l2/downloads/presentations/LeedsJBallroomFWISYMP_2012.pdf
184.
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The STAs have reduced phosphorus loadings by an additional 79%. 186
While neither BMPs nor STAs alone would be sufficient to reduce
loadings to the point necessary to comply with WQS, the combination of
on-farm BMPs and the collection of farm run-off into STAs has resulted
in water entering the Everglades being approximately fourteen times
cleaner than water leaving Lake Okeechobee. 87 After treatment in the
regional STAs, some water is close to meeting the very stringent 10 ppb
1 88
numeric nutrient criteria for phosphorus in the Everglades.
D. Sources of Funding
Any of the methods proposed in this article for reducing the
contribution of agriculture to water quality will require funding. Setting
numeric nutrient criteria and establishing and allocating TMDLs can be
very costly for state governments. Implementing BMPs, whether done
on a voluntary basis or required by regulation, can impose substantial
financial burdens on farmers, many of whom operate on small profit
margins. Moreover, the construction of regional treatment systems such
as the ones in the Everglades Agricultural Area is extremely expensive.
Accordingly, actors should consider a variety of creative finance
mechanisms. State and federal governments could provide additional
financial incentives to farmers who implement BMPs or utilize other
technologies or practices to reduce run-off. This could be accomplished
through direct financial support-which is already being done in a
limited fashion by the EQIP program-or through Payment for
Ecosystem Services.
1. Fertilizer Tax
Section 576.045 of the Florida Statutes imposes various fees on the
use and distribution of fertilizers in the state of Florida. Among other
inspection and licensing fees, the state collects a $0.50 fee on the sale of
every ton of fertilizer that contains nitrogen or phosphorus within the
state. 189
FDACS uses the proceeds for activities that promote
implementing BMPs and achieving state WQS.' 90 Specifically, the funds

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
See id
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 576.045(2)(a)(3) (West 2013).
Id. § 576.045(3)(a).
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are to be used for "[r]esearch, development, demonstration, and
implementation of suitable interim measures, best management practices,
or other measures used to achieve state water quality standards for
nitrogen and phosphorus criteria."' 9 The FDACS may attempt to reach
these goals by using the funds for "cost-sharing grants, technical
assistance, implementation tracking, and conservation leases or other
agreements for water quality improvement."1' 92 Essentially, the funds
collected from the fertilizer fee are to be used to implement BMPs or
other technical programs, which will help reduce the harmful impacts of
nutrient run-off. This type of tax could be expanded to generate funds
needed to provide financial incentives to farmers to reduce pollution. An
added benefit of this type of tax is that it increases the cost of fertilizers,
which may in turn provide a financial disincentive for farmers to use
large amounts of fertilizer. This may ultimately result in a reduction of
nutrient pollution due to fertilizer use. Of course, the tax would need to
be significantly higher than Florida's $0.50 per ton tax to provide a
significant disincentive.
2. Tax to Finance Regional Treatment Systems
A model for a targeted tax to provide funding to construct regional
treatment systems is the Everglades Agricultural Area Privilege Tax.
Section 373.4592(6) of the Florida Statutes sets forth a taxing program
that imposes an "agricultural privilege tax" within the EAA. The tax is
an annual assessment "for the privilege of conducting an agricultural
193
trade or business on" each acre of real property within the EAA.
Initially imposed in 1994, the tax steadily increased from $24.89/acre to
$35/acre in 2013. 9 The Florida Legislature included a possibility for
relief from the tax if the agricultural landowners implemented BMPs that
reduced phosphorus loading by a specified amount.1 95 Landowners are
encouraged to implement BMPs in order to generate "incentive credits,"
which may be used to reduce the imposed
privilege tax to a statutorily
19 6
mandated minimum tax ($24.89/acre).
Revenue generated from the privilege tax is to be used by the South
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 373.4592(6)(a).
Id. § 373.4592(6)(c)(1).
Id. § 373.4592(6)(c)(2).
Id. § 373.4592(6)(c)(4).
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Florida Water Management District to implement the "Long-Term
Plan."' 197 The Long-Term Plan is the district's proposal to meet WQS in
the Everglades region. 198 The district's Long-Term Plan is implemented
using regional Stormwater Treatment Areas and Flow Equalization
Basins. 199 The tax is used to fund projects that mitigate the increased
nutrient loading that results from agricultural operations. Through this
method, the water management district directly imposes a financial
responsibility upon the polluter, as opposed to relying on voluntary or
incentive-based programs.
The imposition of these types of taxes could provide much-needed
funding to develop and implement pollution reduction technologies,
including regional treatment systems. By sharing the burden among all
fertilizer users based on the amount of fertilizer used, the burden on
individual farmers would not be onerous. Furthermore, funds can be
directed to farmers in particular need of financial assistance or to
locations where there is a particular need to reduce pollutant run-off.
V. CONCLUSION

It is inarguable that agricultural production is an essential component
for the continued way of life in the U.S. It is also inarguable that modem
commercial agriculture contributes significantly to the degraded
conditions in our nation's waterbodies.
Regulations designed to improve water quality have failed to
adequately reduce harmful pollution from NPS. The CWA has to a large
extent reined in pollution from PS, but it fails to deal with the whole
problem of water pollution. The CWA leaves the regulation of NPS
pollution to the states, which has led to patchwork and divergent
methods. This paper has not addressed whether the states are the
appropriate government units to address NPS pollution; rather, it has
attempted to summarize the various approaches the states have taken.
The majority of regulations addressing NPS pollution attempt to
reduce pollution through voluntary methods. Non-mandatory BMP
programs and financial assistance are the two most popular voluntary
approaches.
Some states have experimented with market-based
197. Id. § 373.4592(6)(c)(6).
198. Id. § 373.4592(3).
199. SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, RESTORATION STRATEGIES REGIONAL
WATER QUALITY PLAN 4 (2012), available at http://www.sfwmd.gov/portal/page/portal/xrepository/

sfwmdrepository_pdf/rs waterqualityjplan_042712_final.pdf.
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approaches in order to address NPS pollution. Trading programs are
intended to allocate the burdens of reducing pollution among all polluters
in an economically efficient manner. Trading programs set an effective
cap that total pollution may not exceed. Part of the problem with trading
programs in the context of water pollution is the lack of progress in
setting TMDLs, which serve as the cap. Without a numerical limit, it is
impossible to make economic choices about whether to trade and what
the value of a credit is. Trading programs might help reduce costs for
polluters once regulation of water pollution is addressed more
comprehensively, but they are likely only a part of the solution.
Finally, the most reliable method for addressing NPS pollution is
through direct regulation. Direct regulation, whether in the form of a tax,
mandatory BMPs, or load allocation, allows for a measurable standard by
which success may be easily measured. There are numerous reasons
why direct regulation of NPS polluters has lagged behind voluntary and
market-based approaches. However, if states that are burdened by
significant agricultural NPS pollution desire a reliable option for
achieving meaningful improvements in water quality, they need to
seriously consider direct regulation of NPS polluters.
It is likely that there will be no meaningful changes to the CWA,
which would comprehensively address NPS pollution. The current statecentric approach is here to stay, and regulators should be knowledgeable
about the available options in order to make the right choices for their
particular states.

